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This paper argues for a slightly unconventional thesis: public sentiments have been playing 
a formative role in Central-European constitutionalism during the last twenty years. Legal 
scholarship interested in Central-European issues
1
 has not paid serious attention to this 
phenomenon so far, it solely reflected on it as it were of a secondary importance.
2
 However, if 
one takes into account the impact of public sentiments, it can foster a better understanding of 
the last twenty years’ constitutional development. In addition, the assessment of the role of 
public sentiments may open new perspectives for discussion. 
The recent trends of Central-European constitutionalism have already been discussed from 
many aspects in the relevant literature. Philosophical, ideological, historical and legal 
arguments came up in order to explain its features.
3
 However, contrary to the earlier 
approaches this paper relies on the findings of the so-called “law and emotions scholarship” 
becoming more and more popular in the United States. In one word, “law and emotions” 
scholars try to overcome the conventional and widespread modern approach separating law 
and the emotions as two distinct subjects that may have some occasional contact. They argue 
that law and the emotions overlap on many points and they can properly be understood with 
regard to each other.
4
 So, these two phenomena – even if they seem to be generally 
incompatible with each other in the eyes of modern jurisprudence – can and should be studied 
together. Of course, this is a real methodological challenge since neither law nor the emotions 
have a clear conceptual meaning, their interpretations change by varying the philosophical 
bases. Yet, this does not make the analysis of affective impact on legal phenomena impossible 
at all. 
 
1. From emotions to constitutional sentiments 
 
Firstly, to get an adequate conceptual basis for further discussion, some methodological 
points should be clarified. As a starting point, it must be stressed that this analysis is not about 
the emotions in general, but it relies on the concept of constitutional sentiments. As András 
Sajó elaborated it, constitutional sentiments are a part of general public sentiments and their 
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distinctive feature is that they have a constitutional or public affairs relevance.
5
 So, this paper 
does not intend to deal with the emotions in general, but it only formulates certain conclusions 
with a more moderate scope: the domain of public sentiments. 
In general, public sentiments originate from socially interacting individual emotions that 
are able to offer stable, namely long-lasting and enduring, emotional patterns. It is argued by 
Sajó, if society reflects on these emotional patterns in public discussions for a longer while, a 
gradual homogenization and consolidation process starts and this may lead to the formation of 
a new public sentiment. In this public sentiment creating process both culture and media have 
a prominent role. The earlier regulates how people can express emotions, while the latter 
provides various channels to do so. In sum, public sentiments are more than “simple 
aggregation of individual emotions”; they are structured common reflections on public 
concerns.
6
 And, those public sentiments that are primarily focused on constitutional or 
political issues can become constitutional sentiments being able to influence both 
constitutionalism and the corpus of constitutions. 
It is worthwhile showing an example in order to illustrate the earlier theory on the birth of 
public and constitutional sentiments. No one doubts that fear is a general human emotion and 
it can stem from many reasons. People may have fear of the uncertain future, unpredictable 
catastrophes, specific persons, illnesses and many other things. And, people may have fear of 
the uncontrolled, tyrannical power in a community, too. If people start to discuss their worries 
publicly and a longer debate emerges this fear begins to take shape as a structured and 
collective phenomenon acquiring a clear socio-political meaning: power must be limited, 
since the lack of control is dangerous to the society. Thereby a new constitutional sentiment 
emerges and it qualitatively differs from the individual worries since it is articulated within 
the conditions of the political sphere.
7
 Moreover, if the constitution-maker is interested in 
taking into consideration these public concerns on the dangers of unlimited power there might 
be some chances that this public sentiment will be incorporated during on-going design of the 
constitutional architecture. 
When and why can a constitutional sentiment be successful, meaning that it is able to 
influence certain constitutional provisions? Obviously, many constitutional sentiments 
compete in a given historical moment and some of them are unable to exert any influence on 
the development while others may be seemingly successful. Sajó argues that the constitutional 
incorporation of public sentiments is always a result of power choice but there are some 
factors increasing the chances. A major one amongst them is morality. If a constitutional 
sentiment has a strong moral support namely that the people believes that it is generally good 
and things should be so, this might provide a good chance to be reflected in constitutionalism 
in the longer run. The main reason is that politicians generally strive to make decisions in 
conformity with either the majority’s feelings or some widespread moral judgments. Just take 
the example of the abolitionist movement in North America or the formative years of human 
rights declarations at the end of the 18
th
 century. But, it must be emphasized, the 
constitutional incorporation of public sentiments is always culture and age dependent, 
therefore there are no general laws in this sense.
8
 
Having clarified the most important conceptual points a last remark should also be made 
on the validity of this constitutional sentiment-oriented legal understanding. This paper does 
not claim at all that this “law and emotions” approach focused on constitutional sentiments 
entirely explains the unique, maybe divergent, features of Central-European constitutionalism. 
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That would be an apparent exaggeration of its explanatory value since, obviously, there have 
been many other factors – ie. historical, political and cultural ones – shaping the picture of 
these constitutional cultures. What the paper claims is much more modest, simply, the role of 
public sentiments are also worthy of consideration since this way of thinking can make the 




2. National sentiments as engines of constitutional development 
 
It can hardly be denied that a so-called national renaissance has occurred in the region 
during the last twenty years. National sentiments broke out following the fall of iron curtain 
immediately.
10
 Just think of the rebirth of Baltic States, the dissolution of Czechoslovakia and 
Yugoslavia in a relatively short period, and the birth of entirely “new” countries as for 
instance Moldavia or Slovenia. Seemingly, this process means that the people of Central-
Europe reconstructed or reestablished both their national identity and the community 
framework of their existence. All in all, it has considerably changed the map of Central-
Europe in ten years. Furthermore, this harsh rebirth of national sentiments may be regarded as 
a natural reaction to the internationalist and oppressive policies of the Cold-War period trying 
to neutralize the “national question” in Central Europe. 
Besides historical, political and international effects, this regional national revival has also 
become an engine of constitutional development. Interestingly, it led to the formation of such 
legal institutions and solutions that were either entirely new or qualitatively different from the 
Western patterns on some points. That being said, the “westernization” of Central-European 
constitutionalism that followed the fall of Soviet influence has been merged with the strong 
influence of national sentiments. Thus, behind the clear reception of the Western 
constitutional patterns a not as obvious “nationalization” of these constitutional cultures 
happened, too. 
The following examples may properly illustrate the earlier “nationalization” process. 
(i.) At the beginning of 90s, the Baltic States all enacted such acts on citizenship that were 
openly discriminative against the Russian population living in these countries. These acts 
linked the citizenship of a given state to the fulfillment of cultural requirements, for example, 
a good command of the official language. With Western eyes, these acts contravened the 
generally accepted standards of non-discrimination based on nationality, therefore the Council 
of Europe, specially the Venice Commission, was heavily engaged in the dispute over them.
11
 
However, if one applies the constitutional sentiments approach it is not too difficult to identify 
some national sentiments, namely the frustration stemming from the decades-long oppressive 
Soviet policies trying to undermine the Baltic nations’ national identity and existence, as a 
main impetus to that kind of regulation. 
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(ii.) From the 2000’s some of the Central-European countries – ie. Hungary, Romania and 
Slovakia – enacted special acts providing preferential treatment for those who belong to the 
same nation in the neighboring countries. Clearly, the concept of nation as a cultural 
community that may transcend official state boundaries backed these acts. These were the so-
called “status acts” that provided support on the level of both: the individual and the minority 
community.
12
 Again, from many aspects, as for instance the aspect of regional politics, these 
acts seemed to be quite irrational since they apparently disturbed relationship among these 
countries. Furthermore, there was also an intensive internal political discussion since the 
privileges provided by these acts were partially questioned by public opinion. However, the 
primary importance of national sentiments as one of the decisive constitutional sentiments 
properly explains why these countries chose that kind of unusual extraterritorial legislation to 
support some minority groups having the same national identity in the neighboring countries. 
It was not solely a question of legal and political rationality but also had an obvious emotional 
aspect. This emotional dimension took shape as an influential constitutional sentiment and it 
considerably contributed to the birth of these acts. 
(iii.) Lastly, national sentiments even manifested in special constitutional provisions 
declaring the responsibility of these countries for the minority groups living outside of the 
borders. These “national responsibility clauses” are within the first and general articles of the 
constitutions thereby stressing their constitutional importance. These provisions may be 
centered around the cultural identity of a given nation as a belated sign of cultural 
nationalism,
13
 they may form legal basis for acts providing special status for those members 
of the national community who live in the neighboring countries,
14
 or may prescribe 
comprehensive obligations for the given country to support the communities situated outside 
the official state borders.
15
 Contrary to all these divergences, however, these constitutional 
provisions share a common point, they point out to what a high extent the thinking of Central-
European constitution-makers have been seduced by national sentiments stressing the 
imagined national unity. 
In conclusion, national sentiments have gradually been converted into a constitutional 
sentiment considerably affecting the constitutional cultures of Central-European countries in 
the last twenty years. The strong and wide-ranging moral support – only a minority, mostly 
intellectuals, has contested the relevance of national sentiments in these countries – was a 
decisive point in their success. Moreover, the Zeitgeist – so to speak the spirit of the age – 
also helped them to exert influence over public and constitutional affairs as the regional 
political sphere was also opened and sensitive to nationalist policies as compared to the 
Socialist era. 
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4.2. Fear of losing independence 
 
The second sentimental impetus in present-day Central-European constitutionalism is 
undoubtedly fear. It can hardly be debated that fear is one of the most influential sources of 
constitution-making,
16
 yet, the Central-European situation was somewhat different from the 
general, Western pattern. Since the era of Enlightenment the main task of many constitutional 
provisions has been to manage the community’s fear of exclusive and tyrannical power.17 
However, this motive behind the post-Socialist constitutional development has had a slightly 
different character. Here, fear is coupled with the national existence, with special regard to 
political independence. 
One of the main historical experiences of nations in Central-Europe is, indeed, their 
continuous struggle for independence. Peoples of this region have had to fight for their 
independence in the last two centuries many times. Just think of modern Polish history. 
Poland lost its real national independence four times after 1795 (1795, 1815, 1939, 1945), 
although some forms “puppet statehood” have definitely existed in these two centuries. Still, 
political and constitutional autonomy only remained a claim of non-realistic nature. Thus, the 
loss of independence and the forthcoming external oppression – that could come from both 
directions, from the West and the East – is a chief existential experience. As István Bibó, an 
eminent Hungarian scholar of Central-European history argues, it even distorted these 
peoples’ mentality by establishing a special inclination to political hysteria, that is, to pure 
emotional reactions in political questions having an existential nature.
18
 
Therefore, it is not too surprising that this kind of collective fear of losing political and 
national independence have also been transformed into a constitutional sentiment in the post-
1989 era. Central-European constitutions embody it in different ways. 
(i.) The preambles of the region’s constitutions are rich in references to various 
independence fights.
19
 These parts of preambles stress either the importance of these fights in 
national remembrance or the tragic nature of defeats. As a result, they convert them into the 
constitutional sphere. This phenomenon cannot be overlooked since the preambles – although 
their normative value is debated – always inspire the legislator and they also create a central 
narrative for public life. So, the struggle for independence got a symbolic place in Central-
European constitutionalism, and, therefore, it could contribute to the collective management 
of these frustrations. The phrasing of these preambles is always passionate, emotional and 
solemn. Some parts of them are definitely much closer to poetry than to strict legal style and 
vocabulary.
20
 If one regards these elements of Central-European constitutions as a reflection 
of a fear for independence as a constitutional sentiment, their real meaning and value become 
easily identifiable. Basically, their task is to manage the frustration stemming from lost 
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independence fights on a constitutional level by acknowledging their historical role and 
significance. Thus, public sentiments related to tragic national defeats have been transformed 
into constitutional values from historical memory having a rather subjective, relativistic and 
fluid nature. 
(ii.) Secondly, this collective fear of losing independence also influenced a very peculiar 
segment of constitutional provisions. It can be argued that those constitutional articles which 
make the EU accession constitutionally possible by creating a clause for the transfer of some 
sovereign competences to the Union level are quite restrictively worded in Central-European 
constitutions.
21
 The nature of these “Europe-clauses” becomes even more apparent if one 
compares them to Western provisions. For instance, the relevant provision of the Hungarian 
constitution relies on the term of “joint exercise of competences” when regulating the transfer 
of competences to the EU level. Moreover, it stresses that this can only be done to the 
necessary extent thereby raising another substantive limit.
22
 And, besides practical concerns, 
this unique feature can also be explained by those constitutional sentiments that are focused 
on the preservation of national independence and are propelled by the fear for independence.
23
 
That said, the constitutional-sentiments oriented-approach can explain what ordinary 
constitutional law scholarship cannot do properly: why these clauses are so different in 
Central-Europe from the Western solutions. They are tailored in a different, perhaps 
extravagant way, since they reflect the sovereignty concerns of Central-European nations and 




Legal scholarship devoted to the study of constitutional sentiments will not solve all the 
scholarly problems for sure. And, it need not do it at all. The integration of emotional 
components into legal discussion can raise further questions expecting novel answers. 
Nevertheless, the above may illustrate how sentiment related studies can help us get a more 
nuanced and refined picture on unconventional problems of constitutional law. The acts and 
constitutional provisions mentioned above seem to be troublesome factors deviating from the 
Western model as long as only strict constitutional law doctrines are applied. However, if one 
regards them as manifestations of specific constitutional sentiments having various historical 
and socio-cultural roots, they immediately gain a proper meaning and lose their obscurity. 
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